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Competition and Policy Conflicts
in Canada-U.S. Barley Trade
D. Demcey  Johnson and William W. Wilson
Changes  in  policy,  institutional  and competitive  environments  have  led to increased  trade
and a rise in  trade tensions in the Canada-U.S.  barley market.  These  tensions stem  from
policies and marketing institutions that have  evolved independently  in these two countries.
Results  from a detailed  spatial equilibrium  model  of the  Canada-U.S.  barley market  are
presented in this article.  Simulations are used to quantify effects of U.S. import restrictions;
removal of Canadian rail subsidies, different Export Enhancement  Program (EEP) subsidy
levels, restoration  of Conservation Reserve  Program (CRP)  acres to U.S. production,  and
retention of Canadian  Wheat Board control over Canadian  barley sales-all of which affect
trade flows in the barley sector.
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Introduction
Barley  trade  between  the  United  States  and  Canada  has  historically  been  negligible.
However,  recent  changes  in the  policy,  institutional  and  competitive  environments  have
increased  trade and raised trade tensions.  In fact, Canadian exports of grain to the United
States  have  become  a major  source  of friction.'  In  the  1993-94  marketing  year,  U.S.
producers  sought protection from surging barley  imports, which they blamed (in part) on
Canadian rail subsidies and wheat board pricing practices. Institutional and policy changes
(e.g., replacing Canadian rail subsidies with direct producer payments) may  cause further
drastic changes in competitive relationships  and spatial flows.
The Canada-U.S. barley market presents interesting policy contradictions.  In the United
States barley supplies have been restricted through acreage controls, while exports have been
subsidized  through the Export Enhancement Program (EEP). These policies are intended,
in part, to support market prices and reduce costs of deficiency payments. However, the price
disparity between U.S.  and  subsidized  offshore markets  resulting  from this program has
encouraged an influx of Canadian grain, particularly  in the more open-trade  environment
that emerged following the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement  (CUSTA).
Canada's  agricultural  policies  and grain-marketing  institutions  differ drastically.  The
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) has a monopsony on barley procurement for uses other than
domestic  feed.  This facilitates  strategic  behavior by the CWB,  that is, its ability to target
markets and practice price discrimination.  Canada does not have explicit acreage  controls,
although  quotas  have  been  used to  regulate  deliveries  into  the  marketing  system.  The
government provides an important  indirect subsidy to producers through the Western Grain
Transportation  Act  (WGTA):  railroads  are subsidized  for grain movements  to Vancouver
and Thunder Bay, reducing producers' cost of barley shipments to offshore markets and the
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eastern  United  States.  Under  terms  of  the  CUSTA,  WGTA  subsidies  do  not  apply  to
shipments to western  states.  Grain handling costs  are high relative to those in the United
States,  creating  incentives  to  circumvent  Canadian  elevators  through cross-border  truck
shipments to U.S. elevators for shipment beyond.2
Opportunities  for North  American  barley  trade have  inspired much debate  in Canada
(Carter  1993b; Gray, Ulrich, and Schmitz; Brooks; Veeman). Alberta Agriculture (Alberta)
first proposed liberalized  barley trade  in North America, citing the cost-price squeeze  for
prairie producers and the need to seek new market outlets. A major liberalization  of barley
marketing  in Canada was implemented in August  1993. The move toward a "Continental
Barley  Market"  allowed  Canadian  producers  or traders  to  sell directly  to  U.S.  buyers,
bypassing the CWB, which retained control over offshore sales. This was reversed through
a September  1993 court decision.
The purpose of this article  is to analyze effects of selected trade and marketing policies
on barley and malt trade flows, prices and price differentials, and economic welfare. There
are important policy tradeoffs for the United States, such as whether the United States should
pursue  a policy of increasing exports  through EEP,  or a policy of protecting  its domestic
market. Canada confronts equally difficult issues, including whether to remove the CWB's
monopoly over U.S. sales.
In addressing effects of policy changes, numerous complexities  have to be recognized.
First, the Canada-U.S.  barley market comprises many distinct regional markets. Prices are
connected  spatially through transport and handling costs, but also reflect impacts of trade
policies (i.e., U.S. tariffs and export subsidies, and Canadian export permits). Second, quality
factors are an important determinant of regional flows, especially for malting barley.  Third,
published data on feed barley demand at the state or province level do not exist. Feed demand
ultimately depends on the size and composition of livestock herds and on prices of substitute
feedstuffs,  which vary drastically by region.
Our results  are based on  a detailed,  spatial  equilibrium model of the North American
barley market. Several policy simulations are reported. The base case corresponds to a freer
trade regime in Canada. Other simulations show effects of U.S. import restrictions, removal
of Canadian  rail  subsidies, different  EEP subsidy levels,  restoration of the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP) acres to U.S. barley production,  and retention of CWB control over
Canadian barley sales.
The next section provides a brief review of related studies. The spatial model is described
in the third section.  Simulation results are presented  in the fourth section,  and the article
concludes with a discussion of policy implications.
Related  Studies
Recent studies have reached sharply different conclusions about whether the CWB has been
underselling barley (in volume) into the U.S. market, and whether the board should retain a
monopoly over Canadian exports.4 Magnusson and Lerohl suggested that Alberta could sell
1-1.4 mil.  MT  of barley  into  the northwestern  region of the United  States.  Agriculture
Canada reaffirmed that the CWB should remain as the sole exporter of barley to offshore
2See Johnson and Wilson for a detailed  explanation of these mechanisms  and effects.
3See  Johnson and Wilson for a discussion of the institutional differences affecting barley quality in these two countries.
4Several articles  are devoted to this topic  in the November  1993 issue of the Canadian  Journal of Agricultural  Economics.
Veeman  provides a useful summary.
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markets, but recommended that an intensive analysis be undertaken on alternative marketing
arrangements  for North American trade.  The CWB argued that liberalized trade  (i.e.,  the
proposed Continental  Barley Market)  would result in: (a) increased  exports to the United
States and a lower U.S. barley price; (b) reduced returns in offshore  markets; (c) a loss  in
malting  barley premiums;  (d) possible U.S.  retaliation; and  (e) transhipment of Canadian
barley through the U.S. marketing system.
There have been two comprehensive  analyses of the Canada-U.S. barley market. Carter
(1993a) concluded  that the CWB does not exert market power in either the United States or
the world market, and that there are significant opportunities for expanded sales of Canadian
barley to the United States. He suggested that an additional  500,000 MT of feed barley and
400,000 MT of malting barley could be sold to the United States. Producer revenues from
barley could increase by up to 17% under a liberalized marketing system, with no restrictions
on  trade  flows within North America.  These  results were based  on Agriculture  Canada's
Canadian Regional Agricultural Model (CRAM).
Schmitz,  Gray, and Ulrich used a trade model for feed barley comprising four markets:
Canada, the United States, Japan, and other importers (EEP recipients). Demand elasticities,
evaluated  at representative  trade volumes, were  - 0.7, -1.3, - 0.2, and -1.2, respectively.
Critical assumptions were made on intermarket price spreads. In particular, the U.S.-Canada
price spread was specified  as a linear function  of bilateral trade volume, while the spread
between Japan and other importers was set equal to the U.S. EEP subsidy. Results indicated
that a continental barley market would lead to a modest increase in equilibrium trade flow
(from 620,000 MT to 740,000 MT), but a net reduction in Canadian producer welfare due
to the elimination of premiums for sales to Canadian maltsters.
The approaches used in these studies have several limitations, all of which are improved
upon in our analysis. First, neither Carter nor Schmitz, Gray, and Ulrich explicitly modeled
regional  demands  for  feed  barley,  as distinct  from feed grain  use. Second,  they did not
incorporate details on regional malt plant capacity or characteristics of  malting barley supply
and demand (by region). Third, a very important  component of trade is the transportation
and logistical channels linking barley producing  regions to malt plants and malt plants to
breweries.  These  features  are  incorporated  in our spatial equilibrium model, which forces
all barley to be allocated among competing demands.
Empirical Procedures
A mathematical programming model was developed to explain barley trade flows and price
relationships. Components of the model are described first, followed by a section presenting
mathematical specifications  and data sources.
Overview of  the Spatial  Equilibrium Model
The United States ad Canada are divided into different producing and consuming regions;
there are also several  export markets  for barley and malt. The objective is to maximize the
sum of producer and consumer surplus in feed barley markets less the cost of satisfying fixed
regional demands for malt. This formulation treats malt demand as perfectly inelastic, while
allowing feed barley prices and quantities fed (by region) to vary.  The model is static and
determines barley flows within a marketing year with supplies fixed. Available supplies are
based on average annual production during  1989-92.
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The model  includes  30  barley  supply  regions  (23  in the  United  States  and  seven  in
Canada). Barley supplies include four distinct types: feed barley  (varieties not suitable  for
malting),  six-rowed  white malting,  six-rowed  blue malting,  and two-rowed  malting. For
each producing region, supplies are divided among the four types based on recent production
history and quality factors. Quality differences  are important because demand requirements
vary across brewers,  as discussed below.
There are  21  feed  demand  regions  (13  in the  United  States,  six in  Canada,  and  two
offshore markets).  State-  and  province-level  demand  functions were  synthesized  with an
optimization model. Specifically, we used a least-cost feed model developed by Johnson and
Varghese, which combines diet formulations for several classes of livestock in a single linear
programming problem.  Using  1992 livestock inventories as  scaling factors, the least-cost
feed model was adapted for individual states and provinces. Demand schedules were derived
by varying the price of barley incrementally,  holding other prices constant, and solving for
barley quantity. For the spatial model, demand schedules were linearized by fitting regres-
sions to these synthetic data points.5
An important institutional relationship exists in some prairie provinces. In particular, the
Province  of Alberta  has  subsidized  local  barley  feeding  under  the Crow  Benefit  Offset
Program. In Saskatchewan, the Feed Grain Market Adjustment Program is used to offset the
competitive disadvantage of Saskatchewan livestock producers vis-a-vis other provinces. In
the model simulations, effects of these programs are captured by adjusting the transportation
and handling costs for intraprovincial barley flows. Specifically, we reduce the transportation
and  handling  costs by U.S.  $7.90/MT.  This adjustment  encourages  feed use within these
provinces in the base case.  In alternative model  simulations, when compensatory  rail rates
are assumed,  we eliminate  these local feed subsidies.
Data on barley use and trade flows do not exist on a regional basis, making it impossible
to  compare  results  with  actual  observations.  For purposes  of base-case  simulations,  the
model was calibrated to be consistent with bilateral Canada-U.S.  trade flows observed  in
the 1993-94 marketing year. Specifically, we adjusted the intercepts of Canadian provincial
feed demand schedules so that model "predictions" of  net cross-border trade matched USDA
6 projections.
Demand schedules for offshore markets  (EEP and non-EEP) are based on econometric
estimates.7 Both  countries  export from  their Pacific ports  (i.e.,  Portland  and Vancouver).
EEP subsidies ($32/MT  in the base  case) apply to U.S.  export shipments.  Canada's export
price to the non-EEP market  is constrained  to be no  greater than the Portland price.  This
mimics strategic pricing by the CWB in its offshore sales.
There are  19 malt plant locations in the model (13 in the United States and six in Canada)
with different capacity constraints.  Vertical integration  constraints are imposed  at selected
locations,  reflecting  brewer-owned  malt plants.  Malt demand  regions  are identified  with
states or provinces with significant beer production (16 in the United States, six in Canada);
there  are  also  two  export  markets.  For  each  malt  demand  region,  quality  requirements
51n the least-cost feed model, barley demand is conditional on prices of substitute  feedstuffs (e.g., corn and feed wheat),  which
vary substantially  by region. The least-cost model  is formulated as an  LP problem, so that the demand  for feed barley in each
region  is derived as a stepwise  schedule. This was linearized for inclusion  in the spatial model. Implied  price elasticities vary
with quantity demanded and hence are difficult  to summarize.  However,  results repeated  by Johnson and Wilson indicate that
barley demand  is generally price elastic and sensitive to the price of corn, a close substitute.
6Original  feed  demand  parameters,  reported  in Johnson  and  Wilson  (p.  41),  were  derived  using  market  data (prices  of
substitutes and U.S./Canada  exchange rate) from the spring of 1993.  Using these parameters, the model projects a much larger
volume of Canadian exports to the United States than was actually observed in  1993-94. Accordingly,  intercepts forprovincial
feed demand  were adjusted upward  by U.S. $16/MT.
Details are in Johnson and Wilson,  pp. 42--3.
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(percentages of six-rowed white, blue, and two-rowed malt) reflect market shares of major
brewers with known variety requirements.
Transportation and handling costs are based on recent truck and rail rates, and handling
margins  at U.S.  and Canadian  elevators.  For individual  origins  and destinations,  several
alternative  movements were identified (e.g., truck,  rail, or combination);  least-cost move-
ments  were  identified  and  incorporated  in the  analysis.  In particular,  the model  allows
prairie-border-crossing  trade, an alternative to traditional Canadian east-west movements.
Mathematical  Specification
The model is specified  as a quadratic programming problem (Takayama  and Judge). The
objective is to maximize the sum of producer and consumer  surplus in feed barley markets
minus the costs of satisfying fixed regional demands for malt.
Let Xik denote a shipment ('000 MT)  from producing region i to feed demand regionj.
The index  k denotes  barley type.  There  are  four types  of barley:  feed,  six-rowed white
malting,  six-rowed  blue  malting,  and  two-rowed  malting.  The  four  types  are  perfect
substitutes  in feed  demand;  however,  only malting types  are shipped to  malt plants.  For
notational convenience, we use the index h to refer to the subset of malting types. Shipments
from producing regions to malt plants ('000  MT) are denoted  Ymh,  where m identifies the
malt plant location.  Shipments of malt ('000 MT) to beer production regions  are denoted
Zmnh,  where n identifies the malt destination and h the malt type. The objective function  is
defined as:
QJ
W=JE  (I  - P Qf)dQj -ZZZXijkTx
(1)  i  o  i  j  k
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i  m  h  m  n  h
where  Qj is total barley feed use in regionj;
(2)  Q  Z  X  =  Xk  Vi;
i  k
aj and  pj  are regional  feed demand parameters; and Txi,  Tyim,  and Tzmn are transportation
cost parameters  ($/MT). The latter include freight costs and handling  margins, as well  as
applicable  import  tariffs  and  export  subsidies.  Because  barley  supplies  are  fixed,  total
producer and consumer surplus is represented by the area under regional demand schedules
less transportation costs.  The objective function (1) is maximized subject to constraints on
regional feed use, barley supplies, malt plant capacities, brewer ownership of selected malt
plants, and malt requirements in beer production regions.
Regional barley feed use, Q,,  is constrained to be less than estimated total consumption
of feed grains:
Qj <  Qj  .
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Maximum feed use parameters  were taken from Carter (1 993a, pp. 51-5), or derived by the
authors  using  1992  livestock inventories  for individual  states and provinces.  No  quantity
limits were applied to offshore feed barley markets.
Barley prices in feed markets are given by
(4)  .=a.-P ,  V (4)  P.i  :  (j  - ~.iQj  an,
In general, the North American demand schedules are highly elastic. Evaluated at base-case
quantities, demand elasticities in western states range from -3.8 in Montana to -7.4 in Idaho
and -17.6 in California (the largest barley feeding state). For comparison, demand elasticities
in the prairie provinces average - 4.0 in the base case. Highly elastic demand schedules are
consistent with  expectations,  given the  close substitutability of barley  for corn  and other
feed grains in livestock rations.  However, these regional elasticities are substantially greater
than those used  in Schmitz, Gray, and Ulrich.
Offshore prices are measured at Pacific ports, Portland and Vancouver. To mimic strategic
pricing by the wheat board, offshore prices are constrained as follows:
(5)  Inon-EEP 
< PEEP +EEP,
where  PnonEEp is the price in non-EEP markets  ($/MT), PEE  is the price in EEP markets
($/MT), and EEP is the U.S. export bonus ($/MT). This discourages U.S. exports to non-EEP
markets.
For each barley producing region, supply constraints are specified as follows:




h +  Yil  < Ail  Edi, h,
.I  itn
where  A, fid denotes availability of feed-quality barley ('000 MT);  and Ah denotes  avail-
ability  of  malting-quality  barley  (type  h)  in region  i. The  latter  constraint  reflects  the
alternative  destinations  for malting-quality barley, that is, feed markets  (indexed byj) and
malt plants (indexed by m).
Material-balance  and capacity constraints apply to all malt plants. These have the form:
(8)  0.75a  Yh >  Z,,,,,h  Vm, h,
i  n
and
8Carter (1  993a, p. 59) estimated  the price elasticity of U.S. demand (aggregated across barley types and regions) for Canadian
barley at -19.
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(9)  E2Z  /,￿C,  V, E  E  Yimih  < Cm  Vm,
i  hI
where  0.75  is a  barley-malt  conversion  factor,  and  Cm  is  the plant  capacity  ('000  MT
barley/annum).  Additional  restrictions  apply  to  selected  brewer-owned  malt  plants;  by
assumption, these plants operate at full capacity and supply malt exclusively  to breweries
owned by the same parent (i.e., Anheuser-Busch or Coors).
For beer production regions (indexed by n), total malt requirements (TMR) are specified.
These are based on 1991 beer production by region and different conversion factors for U.S.
and Canadian breweries:
(10)  - Zmh 2 TMR  Vn.
m  h
For U.S. beer production,  the  conversion rate is  24  Ibs.  of malt per barrel; for Canadian
production, the rate is 36 Ibs. per barrel. Minimum and maximum allowable percentages are
also specified for each malt type, as follows:
Zmnh MINPC,  ,,  m  MAXP ( 11)  MNC,,^  <  MAXPC,Ih  Vn, h.
100  ZZZ,,,,,h  100
m  h
The allowable percentages, MINPCh,  and MAXPC,,h,  are based on known requirements of
major brewers, weighted by company shares of regional production capacity.
U.S. and  Canadian exports  of malting  barley and malt to third markets (offshore  and
Mexico) are fixed exogenously. The model does not include producer prices per se; producer
prices can be computed as a weighted average of the shadow prices associated with supply
constraints in barley producing regions. Similarly, there are no malt prices in the model other
than  the  shadow  prices  associated  with  demand  constraints  at  different  points  in  the
marketing system. These reflect the opportunity cost of malting barley (i.e.,  in terms of its
alternative  feed use) in addition to transportation and handling costs.
The solution satisfies the usual assumptions of spatial equilibrium, no excess demand in
consuming regions  and absence of profitable arbitrage  opportunities. However,  the United
States  discriminates between offshore markets through  its use of EEP subsidies,  while the
constraint on price spreads allows Canada to dominate the nonsubsidized offshore market.
Data Sources
Production  data used in this study were  derived  from several  sources. Data  on U.S. area
planted, harvested, and yields were taken from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, National
Agricultural  Statistics  Service  (USDA/NASS).  For  Canada,  the  same  data  were  from
Agriculture Canada sources. Data on barley quality were developed from Know Your Barley
Varieties (American Malting Barley Association) and Barley Briefs (Brewing and Malting
Barley Research Institute) for the United States and Canada, respectively. Grade factor data
in the United States were from state-level quality reports, and Canadian acceptance rates are
from Carter (1993a, p.  10).
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Data for the United States brewing industry are from Brewers Almanac 1992, published
by the Beer Institute and Brewer s Digest. 1991 Buyers Guide and Brewery Directory. Data
for  Canada  are from the  1992  statistical bulletin  of the  Brewers  Association of Canada,
Ottawa (Brewers). U.S. beer production capacities at the state level were derived from the
Brewers Almanac and company sources. U.S. and Canadian malt plant locations, ownership,
and capacities  are those listed in the Canadian Wheat Board report and were valid in 1992.
Exports of malting barley and malt to third countries were taken from Canadian Wheat Board
sources and were set equal to the five-year average ending 1991.
Transport  and handling  costs are from a number of sources. U.S.  rail rates were taken
from Burlington Northern and CP/Soo Line Tariffs. Missing rail rates were estimated using
data in the 1991 Waybill Data  Tape (Interstate Commerce Commission). Canadian rates were
taken from Canadian Pacific (CP) and Canadian National (CN) Rail Tariffs. Trucking costs
and formulas and handling costs were  from industry sources in each country.
Simulation Results
Base-Case: Continental  Barley Market
Our base-case  assumptions  reflect  a freer  marketing  regime  in Canada.  Specifically,  we
assume  the  following:  (a) quantitative  restrictions  do not apply to  cross-border  flows  of
barley or malt;  (b) Canada does  not regulate  imports through the granting of permits; (c)
current U.S. tariffs apply to imports of barley and malt from Canada; (d) Canadian rail rates
reflect  current WGTA subsidies;  and (e)  cross-border  truck/rail shipments  are allowed to
U.S. barley destinations.  These assumptions  deviate  from past marketing practices.  Most
important,  perhaps,  is that barley  is allowed to move directly across  the border by truck,
bypassing the Canadian handling  sector (but still incurring U.S. handling costs), if that is
optimal.
The model projects 1.4 mil. MT of Canadian barley exports to the United States, including
0.9 mil. MT of feed barley,  in the base case (table  1). This is approximately the trade level
observed in 1993-94. U.S. domestic feed use (5.4 mil. MT)9and Canadian feed use (5.5 mil.
MT) are similar to levels observed  in recent years. Canada also exports about 0.5 mil. MT
of malting barley to the United States.  Two-row malting barley  accounts for over 90%  of
these malting barley exports.  Average producer prices  are higher in the United States than
in Canada. U.S. producer prices are $1.82/bushel (averaged over all U.S. producing regions
and barley types), while Canadian producer prices  are $1.61/bushel.  Among other factors,
this difference reflects the proximity of U.S. producing regions to high-priced feed markets
and malting capacity.
Results  confirm  the  importance  of West  Coast feed  markets.  California  and Nevada
represent  the highest-priced  feed barley markets due to transportation  costs and expensive
feed substitutes.  U.S. prices are lowest in midwestern barley-producing  states. Prices in the
prairie  provinces  are the  lowest  of all  regions.  These  results  are consistent  with  recent
observations.
California represents  the largest U.S.  feed demand  region,  with barley feed use of 1.8
mil. MT (fig.  1).  The northwestern states  (Oregon, Washington,  and Idaho) account for an
9This is close  to the actual  level of U.S. barley  feed use in  1993-94. For perspective,  in recent years barley has accounted
for no more than 3-4% of total  U.S. feed use of coarse  grains.
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Table  1.  Base-Case  Simulation Results: Trade, Domestic  Use,  and Prices
United States  Canada
Bilateral Trade Flows (TMT)
Exports
Feed barley  0  883
Malting barley  97  504
Malt  0  188
Net Bilateral  Trade (exports - imports)
Feed barley  -883  883
Malting barley  -407  407
Malt  -188  188
Offshore  Feed Exports
Subsidized markets  1,903  0
Nonsubsidized markets  0  2,695
Domestic Use (thsd.  MT)
Feed use  5,356  5,539
Malting use  2,759  871
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Figure 1.  Feed barley quantity sold by market, base-case solution
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additional  1.7  mil.  MT  of feed  barley  demand  and are  supplied extensively by  Canada.
Canada captures  16% of the U.S. feed barley market. Canadian exports of malting barley to
the U.S.  West Coast are particularly  large.  The U.S.  Midwest,  where  most U.S.  malting
capacity  is located,  is principally  served by U.S. producing regions.  Canada's share of the
U.S. malting barley market is  18%  in the base case.
Regional  flows  provide  an  interesting  perspective  on  the  U.S.  EEP program.  Under
base-case  assumptions,  subsidized  U.S.  export  shipments  originate  largely  in  western
Montana, Washington,  Oregon,  and Idaho. Feed markets in these states receive substantial
inflows of barley from adjoining regions,  including  southern Alberta.  This highlights the
fungible aspect of barley supplies. The model does not allow Canadian barley to qualify for
U.S. export subsidies; however, grain exported under EEP can be replaced in U.S. markets
by imports from Canada.
U.S. Import Restrictions
Under terms  of the Canadian-U.S.  Free  Trade Agreement,  the United  States retained its
rights under  Section 22  of the  Agricultural  Adjustment  Act.  Section  22  empowered  the
secretary  of agriculture  to  restrict imports  (through ad valorem duties  or quotas)  if they
adversely affect the operation of domestic  farm programs.  In early  1994, the United States
threatened  to  invoke  Section 22 to curtail imports of Canadian wheat.. Similar  action was
urged by U.S. barley producers in response to a surge of imports from Canada.' °
We  introduced  import quotas  on  barley in the  base-case  model  to  evaluate  potential
implications of U.S. trade restrictions (see table 2). With zero barley imports from Canada,
the average price received by U.S. producers increases to $1.86 per bushel-about four cents
higher than in the base case.  For Canadian producers,  the average price  decreases to U.S.
$1.54 per bushel-seven cents lower than in the base case. Thus, elimination of U.S. barley
imports increases the cross-border  gap in average producer prices  from 21  to 32 cents per
bushel.
With zero Canadian barley allowed into the United States,  Canada's domestic feed use
increases from 5.5 to 6.7 mil. MT, and U.S. feed use decreases  from 5.3 to 4.4 mil. MT. As
the U.S. import quota is increased from zero to 0.5 mil. MT, there are corresponding changes
in domestic  feed use  and  (to  a  lesser extent)  offshore  exports.  Relaxing the U.S.  import
constraint causes Canadian barley to be shifted away from domestic markets and toward the
United States.
The United States could also restrict imports by increasing the tariff on Canadian barley
(currently  $1/MT).  To  evaluate  the efficacy  of higher  tariffs  as  an alternative  to  import
quotas, U.S.  tariffs were raised incrementally  in model simulations.  Results suggest that a
U.S. tariff of $10/MT would be prohibitive for feed barley; however, the United States would
still import 0.4 mil. MT of Canadian malting barley. To reduce malting barley imports to 0.1
mil. MT, the U.S. barley tariff would have to increase to $15/MT.
Compensatory  Rail Rates
Canadian rail subsidies have been a major source of trade conflict between the United States
and Canada.  In response  to budgetary pressures and the General Agreement  on Trade and
0With  implementation  of the  GATT agreement,  Section 22 will  no longer provide  a basis for unilateral  trade restrictions.
Under Article 28 of  the GATT, United States can still legally impose restrictions if it provides adequate compensation to affected
trading partners.
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Table 2.  Results from Alternative Simulations: Trade, Domestic  Use,  and Prices
Compen-
U.S. Import Quota  satory  Return
Base  0 mil.  0.5  mil.  Rail  U.S. EEP Bonus ($/MT)  of CRP
Variable  Case  MT  MT  Rates  0  40  60  Acres
Canadian  Barley Exports
(mil.  MT):
to United States  1.39  0.00  0.50  2.70  0.52  1.50  1.78  1.23
to offshore markets  2.89  3.02  2.96  1.63  3.55  2.89  2.86  2.91
Totals  4.28  3.02  3.46  4.33  4.07  4.39  4.64  4.14
U.S. Offshore  Exports
(mil.  MT):  1.95  1.66  1.72  2.53  0.05  2.35  3.58  2.08
Domestic Feed Use (mil. MT):
Canada  5.54  6.71  6.28  5.51  5.75  5.49  5.21  5.68
United States  5.36  4.36  4.76  6.07  6.39  5.02  4.09  6.63
Average Producer  Prices:
Canada
(US $/MT)  73.81  70.53  72.04  68.61  73.08  74.05  74.78  73.33
($/bu.)  1.61  1.54  1.57  1.49  1.54  1.61  1.63  1.60
United  States
(US $/MT)  83.46  85.58  84.83  83.36  81.69  84.70  87.12  80.90
($/bu.)  1.82  1.86  1.85  1.81  1.78  1.84  1.90  1.76
Tariffs  (GATT)  rules,  the  Canadian  government  has proposed  changes  in the method  of
payment.  Existing subsidies,  paid by the Canadian  government  to the railroads, would be
converted  into  direct  payments  to producers  over the  course of four years  (Milling and
Baking News, p. 45). For purposes of model simulations,  rates for applicable Canadian rail
movements are adjusted to the  full WGTA level.  With fully compensatory rates,  shippers
pay  the  total  cost of shipping,  including  the  portion  previously  paid  by the  Canadian
government.  This raises  the shipping rate to Vancouver  (for export) and Thunder Bay (for
eastern destinations). These higher rail rates, and the concurrent elimination of subsidies for
grain feeding in Alberta and Saskatchewan, make prairie border-crossing  movements more
attractive.
Results  indicate  that  compensatory  rates  widen  the  gap between  U.S.  and  Canadian
producer prices. Canadian exports to offshore markets are reduced (relative to the base case)
because of higher shipping costs to Vancouver. With unrestricted access to the U.S. market,
Canada  exports  2.7  mil.  MT  of barley  to the  United  States-nearly two-thirds  of total
Canadian exports.  These results illustrate that elimination of Canadian rail subsidies does
not advance  U.S. producer  interests.  To the contrary,  higher  shipper costs depress barley
prices  in Canadian producing regions,  inducing  larger  flows of Canadian  barley into  the
United States.
The Export Enhancement Program
The Export  Enhancement Program (EEP) has an important influence  on North American
barley flows and has also been an important source of dispute between these two countries.
74  July 1995Competition and Policy Conflicts in Canada-US.  Barley Trade  75
U.S. export subsidies depress world prices and increase U.S. prices, thereby enhancing the
attractiveness of U.S. markets relative to Canada's alternatives. From a Canadian perspec-
tive, EEP has been one of the most significant causes of bilateral disputes over grain trade.
To quantify these  effects,  the model  was simulated  with alternative levels of the EEP
bonus  (subsidy  per  metric  ton).  As  expected,  a  higher  EEP bonus raises  average  U.S.
producer prices. The United States does not export significant quantities of barley until the
EEP bonus rises above $20/MT;  thereafter, U.S. exports  increase and domestic prices rise,
inducing larger imports from Canada. The United States remains a net importer of barley at
all  bonus levels  considered  (from  $0  to  $60/MT).  This  suggests that  even  if EEP were
eliminated,  there are  substantial  economic  inducements  for  Canadian  sales  into the U.S.
market-particularly  sales of malting barley.
The  impact  of EEP  for  Canadian  producer  revenue  depends  on  assumptions  about
bilateral trade restrictions.  When Canada is denied access to the U.S. market (i.e.,  through
zero import quota),  Canadian revenue drops precipitously with increases  in the EEP bonus
above  $20/MT  (fig.  2).  This  is essentially  due to the price-depressing  effects  of EEP in
subsidized offshore markets. On the other hand, when Canada enjoys unrestricted access to
the  U.S.  market,  Canadian  revenue  is enhanced  by higher  EEP bonuses.  While  higher
bonuses displace Canadian barley from subsidized offshore markets, Canada benefits from
the rise in U.S. barley prices induced by EEP sales.
Restoration  of CRP Acres to U.S. Production
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) contributed to the loss of  U.S. barley acres during
the mid- 1  980s.  To evaluate the significance of this program, simulations were conducted in
which  CRP  acres  were  restored  to  barley  production  in  four  major  producing  states:
Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota, and South Dakota. This leads to a 19%  increase in U.S.
barley output relative to the base case.
Results indicate that U.S.  barley imports from Canada would be slightly reduced, from
1.39  mil. MT to  1.23  mil. MT,  because  the rise  in U.S.  supply is  accompanied by a large
increase in domestic feed use. While the return of CRP acres to production would have little
impact on aggregate trade flows, average producer prices would fall in both countries. U.S.
producer revenue would  rise by  15%  due to the increased barley output.
Retention of Wheat Board Control  over Barley
The foregoing simulations are premised on a competitive marketing environment: in absence
of quantitative restrictions, shippers are free to sell barley wherever they receive the highest
price net of transportation costs. As a result, for each producing region in the model, prices
received  (net of transportation)  are  equalized  across  shipping  destinations,  except when
import quotas apply.
This ignores one of the principal features of Canada's marketing system-the role of the
Canadian Wheat Board.  By virtue of its single-seller  status in Canada, the CWB can price
barley differently to U.S. and offshore markets and,  so (in principle), maximize returns to
Canadian  producers.  Price  discrimination  is  closely  linked  to  Canada's  price  pooling
mechanism;  neither  feature  is  consistent  with  the  type of competitive  market  behavior
IAs  a  practical  matter,  the  price  pooling  mechanism  depends on  the board's  monopoly  position:  if sales by Canadian
producers  were unrestricted, then barley would flow through private  market channels whenever prices trended upward.











0  10  20  30  40  50  60
EEP Bonus ($/MT)
Figure 2.  Impact of EEP on Canadian producer revenues,  free trade vs.  U.S.  import
quota
embedded in our spatial model."  However,  by varying  the level of exports to the United
States, the optimal trade volume from the board's perspective can be identified-that is, that
which maximizes Canadian producer revenue.
For  purposes  of these  simulations,  Canadian  imports  of U.S.  barley  and  malt  are
constrained to zero, which is consistent with Canada's current practice of limiting imports
through a license system. Canadian barley exports to the United States are varied paramet-
rically, with Canadian producer revenue (aggregated across producing regions and shipping
destinations) evaluated at each trade level, as shown in figures 3 and 4. Results indicate that
Canadian  producer  revenue  is maximized  at  about  4  mil.  MT  of exports  to  the United
States-far above  the  level  under competitive  free-trade  conditions  (i.e.,  the base case).
Increases  in Canadian  exports to the United  States result  in losses for U.S. producers  and
for consumers in Canadian and offshore feed markets.
Sources  of Canadian  producer  revenue  were  identified  for different  levels  of barley
exports to the United States. As revenues from Canadian sales to the U.S. market increase,
revenues from other Canadian sales (domestic and offshore) decrease. Tradeoffs clearly exist
among  Canada's  external  markets;  the surprising aspect of these results,  in view of past
analyses by the CWB, is that the board's optimal strategy is so heavily weighted toward U.S.
sales.
The results  hinge  on demand relationships  embedded  in the  model;  in particular,  on
relationships  between  prices received  (net of transportation)  and  elasticities  in U.S.  and
offshore  feed markets. A discriminating monopolist equates  marginal revenue across mar-
kets.  In a two market context, this leads to the condition
2
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.........  to U.S. Market  ......
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Figure 3.  Disaggregation of welfare effects, various levels of CWB sales to United
States
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(12)  MRl =pl(l+l/&l)=p 2(l+l1/2)=MR2,
where MR1 is marginal  revenue in market i (i =  1, 2),  ei represents  the price elasticity of
demand in market i, and pi is the market price  (net of transportation cost in this context).
With manipulation this becomes
PI  81E2 +El
(13)  i  12  L
P2  &1l2 +£ 2
Assuming  Ei < 0 and lei  > l(i = 1, 2), it is clear that if the first market is more price elastic
(i.e.,  led >  e21), thenpl/P2 < l(price is lower in market 1).
Feed markets  in the  model are price  elastic,  particularly  the U.S. regional  markets.
Elasticities in the international and Canadian markets are smaller (in absolute value). Hence,
the board has an incentive to expand U.S. sales beyond levels consistent with competitive
equilibrium-in  effect,  absorbing  a price  discount  for  U.S.  sales  relative  to  alternative
markets.
Another  feature  of the  model  is  relevant  to  this  discussion.  The  price  received  for
Canadian offshore sales (i.e., to non-EEP markets) is constrained to be less than or equal to
the Portland price.  When constraint  (5)  is binding,  U.S. and  Canadian  export prices  are
directly linked. However,  when  it is not binding, Canada can expand sale volumes to the
U.S.  market  without  suffering  any  direct,  price-depressing  effects  in non-EEP  offshore
markets. This is contrary to contentions by the CWB that higher exports to the U.S. Pacific
Northwest would necessarily lower Canadian returns from offshore sales.  Such a result is
possible, but not necessary,  in the context of spatial competition.
The main implication bears emphasis: due to U.S. markets being more price elastic than
Canada's  offshore  alternatives  (as also  suggested  by Carter  1993a),  the board's  optimal
selling strategy would be to expand U.S. sales beyond the level that would be  consistent
with a liberalized marketing system in Canada.
Summary and Discussion
Barley  trade  between  the  United  States  and  Canada  has  traditionally  been  negligible.
However,  recent changes  in  the  institutional  and  policy  environments  have  resulted  in
increased trade, as well as increased tensions within and between these countries.  Some of
these  hold potential  for further,  drastic  changes  in  competitive  relationships  and spatial
flows.
A mathematical  programming  model was  developed to  analyze  the  North American
barley market. The model was used to identify optimal trade flows and corresponding prices
under alternative  policy  assumptions.  In the base-case  scenario,  we  assume a  freer trade
regime in Canada, similar to that which would have evolved under the Continental Barley
proposal.  Bilateral trade in barley and malt are unrestricted;  import duties are imposed by
the United States;  subsidized rail rates apply in Canada; and U.S. export sales to offshore
markets are subsidized through the EEP program.
With demand parameters  calibrated to reflect the  1993-94 marketing  year, the  model
projects  1.4 mil. MT of Canadian barley exports to the United States. This includes 0.9 mil.
MT of feed barley, which is sold in western U.S. feed markets. Canada ships 0.5 mil. MT of
malting barley to the United States, primarily to West Coast malting plants. If the U.S. barley
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imports were eliminated (e.g.,  through Section 22), average producer prices would be four
cents per bushel higher in the United States and seven cents per bushel lower in Canada.
One of the more important policies affecting prairie-border-crossing  barley flows is the
rail  subsidy  regime  currently  used  in  Canada.  Increasing  Canadian  rail  rates  depresses
Canadian prairie barley prices, so that prairie-border-crossing shipments become the optimal
movement for a significant portion of Canadian barley. Results indicate that the equilibrium
quantity of barley exported from Canada to the United States increases by 1.3 mil. MT under
this scenario.
Increases  in  EEP bonuses  raise  the  U.S.  domestic  price  relative  to  the  international
market. In response, U.S. barley imports from Canada increase. With higher subsidy levels,
gains in U.S. producer revenue from export sales are partly offset by losses in revenue from
the domestic market.  Canadian  producer revenue  drops sharply with EEP bonuses  above
$20/MT and restricted access to the U.S. export market. However, with unrestricted access
to the U.S. market, Canadian revenue  increases with a rise in the EEP bonus level. This is
due to being able to sell in the higher priced U.S. market, replacing the U.S. barley that is
exported under subsidy.
The role of the Canadian Wheat Board  in a North American barley market has major
implications.  As sole-seller agency, the CWB has an objective of maximizing the revenue
received by Canadian producers.  Discriminatory pricing  and strategic  allocation of sales
among customers  are essential components of the overall CWB strategy. This requires that
the CWB sell barley wherever marginal revenues are highest-in effect, equalizing marginal
revenues across  markets. In our analysis, U.S. market elasticities are greater than those in
Canada's  offshore and domestic markets.  Under these circumstances,  Canadian producer
revenue is maximized with sales to the United States of about 4.0 mil. MT, compared to 1.4
mil. MT in the competitive base-case solution. This results in losses for U.S. producers and
for consumers  in Canadian and offshore feed markets, but gains to U.S. consumers.
Policy Discussion
Numerous  pressures  are now  being exerted  on the North  American barley market.  Ulti-
mately, these stem from policies and marketing institutions that have evolved independently
in the United States and Canada. In combination, these factors have led to price distortions
within North America,  increased  imports of Canadian barley into  the United  States, and
pressures to make drastic alterations in the Canadian marketing system.
In each  country,  existing policies and institutions  are challenged  by the evolution of a
more open-trading  environment  for barley and malt. Results of this study are important to
the  policy debates  regarding  North American  barley trade.  First,  given the geographical
distribution of demand and supply, relative demand elasticities, and transport and handling
costs,  economic pressures exist for increased  movement of Canadian barley to the United
States. A positive  level of imports would exist even in the absence of the EEP program.
However, the equilibrium import level increases in response to the following  factors: EEP
bonuses, reductions in U.S. planted acreage due to CRP or other programs, and elimination
of direct payment of the WGTA subsidy to Canadian railroads.
Second, the Export Enhancement Program was conceived in an era when barley imports
from Canada were negligible.  However, under freer trade  and absent any mechanism  for
bilateral  policy coordination,  this program  results in increased  imports  from Canada  and
reduced  U.S. producer  revenue  from domestic  sales.  Increased EEP bonuses  expand the
volume  of U.S.  exports;  however,  the  impact  on  U.S.  producer  prices  is  mitigated  by
increased  imports of Canadian  barley.  This  confronts  the United  States  with  a  strategic
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choice:  whether or not to protect the U.S.  domestic market by increasing  exports through
EEP.
Third, the WGTA subsidy mechanism  has been controversial  in Canada and a focus of
ongoing  trade  disputes.  Allegations  are made  that this  subsidy  provides  an  unfair trade
advantage  to Canada  and  is one  reason for the  increased  volume  of trade.  However,  our
results  demonstrate  that  elimination  of this  subsidy  (or  conversion  to  direct  producer
payments)  would result in an increased  flow of Canadian barley to the United  States. This
is due  to the relative  costs of alternative  logistical  channels and opportunities  for spatial
arbitrage,  which were not considered under previous marketing arrangements.
[Received September 1994; final version received  March 1995.]
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